Guangdong SAMR Issues "Guangdong Guidelines on Anti-Monopoly Compliance for Internet Platform Operators

Guangdong Province Internet Platform Operator Competition Compliance Guidelines (Anti-Monopoly)

　　Table of contents

　　Chapter 1 General Provisions

　　Chapter Two: Monopoly Agreements

　　Chapter Three Abuse of Market Dominance

　　Chapter Four Concentration of Undertakings

　　Chapter Five Abuse of Administrative Power to Exclude or Restrict Competition

　　Chapter Six: Legal Liability and Obligation to Cooperate with Investigations

　　Chapter Seven Internal Compliance Management for Business Operators

　　Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions

　　Chapter 1 General Provisions

　　Article 1 Purpose and Basis. This guideline is formulated to guide internet platform operators in our province to strengthen anti-monopoly compliance management, prevent anti-monopoly legal risks for internet platform operators, enhance the transparency of anti-monopoly enforcement by the province's anti-monopoly enforcement agencies, protect fair and free competition and encourage innovation among internet platform operators, continuously optimize the business environment of our province, and promote the high-quality development of the platform economy, based on the newly revised Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the "Anti-Monopoly Law") and related provisions, combined with the actual situation of our province and anti-monopoly enforcement practices, understanding, and awareness.

　　Article 2 Scope of Application. This guideline serves as a guide for internet platform operators to conduct anti-monopoly compliance management and applies to all internet platform operators and operators within their platforms within the administrative region of this province. Public resource trading platforms (centers) managed by government functional departments or industry organizations, as well as operators of self-built websites, mobile applications (APPs), etc., that sell goods or provide services through the internet or other information networks, may refer to this guideline for internet platform operators.

　　Article 3. Basic Principles. Anti-monopoly enforcement agencies shall adhere to the principles of protecting fair market competition, lawful, scientific, and efficient regulation, stimulating innovation and creativity, and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of all parties when conducting anti-monopoly supervision of internet platform operators and businesses operating within those platforms.

　　Article 4. Relevant Concepts. Platform operators refer to legal persons and non-legal persons that provide internet platform services such as business premises, transaction matching, and information exchange to natural persons, legal persons, and other market entities. Platform operators refer to operators who provide goods or services within the internet platform. Platform operators may also directly provide goods or services through the platform while operating it. Unless otherwise specified, the operators in this guide refer to both internet platform operators and platform operators.

　　The term "competing operators" as used in this guide includes actual operators competing in the same relevant market and potential operators that may enter the relevant market to compete.

　　Anti-monopoly compliance refers to the compliance of the business management practices of internet platform operators or operators within the platform and their employees with the requirements of the Anti-Monopoly Law and other laws, regulations, rules and normative documents.

　　The anti-monopoly enforcement agency refers to the anti-monopoly enforcement agency of the State Administration for Market Regulation or the Guangdong Provincial Administration for Market Regulation.

Topic 1: Classification and Grading of Internet Platforms

　　1. Platform Classification

　　(1) Online sales platforms (connecting people and goods): including but not limited to comprehensive commodity trading platforms, vertical commodity trading platforms, supermarket group buying platforms, etc.

　　(2) Life service platforms (connecting people and services): including but not limited to sub-platforms such as travel services, tourism services, delivery services, housekeeping services, and real estate brokerage.

　　(3) Social entertainment platforms (connecting people): including but not limited to instant messaging, gaming, audio-visual services, live streaming, short video, and literature platforms.

　　(4) Information and information platforms (connecting people and information): including but not limited to news portals, search engines, user-generated content (UGC) platforms, audio-visual information platforms, news organizations, and other sub-platforms.

　　(5) Financial service platforms (connecting people and funds): including but not limited to comprehensive financial services, payment and settlement, consumer finance, financial information, securities investment and other sub-platforms.

　　(6) Computing application platforms (connecting people and computing power): including but not limited to smart terminal platforms, operating system platforms, mobile software (APP) application stores, information management platforms, cloud computing platforms, network service platforms, industrial internet platforms, etc.

　　2. Platform Tiers

　　(1) A super platform refers to a platform that simultaneously possesses an extremely large user base, an extremely wide range of business types, an extremely high economic scale, and extremely strong restrictive capabilities. Specific criteria: annual active users in China in the previous year are not less than 500 million; core businesses involve at least two types of platform businesses; the previous year's value (estimated value) is not less than RMB 1 trillion; and it has extremely strong capabilities to restrict merchants from contacting consumers (users).

　　(2) Large-scale platforms refer to platforms that simultaneously possess a large user base, a wide range of business types, a diverse business scope, a high economic scale, and strong restrictive capabilities. Specific criteria: annual active users in China in the previous year are not less than 50 million; the platform has outstanding main business performance; the previous year's value (estimated value) is not less than RMB 100 billion; and the platform has strong capabilities to restrict merchants from contacting consumers (users).

　　(3) Small and medium-sized platforms refer to platforms with a certain user base, limited business types, limited economic scale, and limited restrictive capabilities. Specific criteria: having a certain number of annual active users in China; having certain business operations; having a certain market value (valuation); and having certain restrictive capabilities for merchants to reach consumers (users).

　　Chapter Two: Monopoly Agreements

　　Article 5. Horizontal monopoly agreements are prohibited. A monopoly agreement refers to an agreement, decision, or other coordinated action by an internet platform operator or operators within the platform to exclude or restrict competition. Agreements or decisions may be in written, oral, or online communication form.

　　Internet platform operators or operators within the platform that are in competition shall not use data and algorithms, technology, and platform rules to reach horizontal monopoly agreements, such as fixing or changing commodity prices, restricting the production or sales quantity of commodities, dividing the sales market or raw material procurement market, restricting the purchase of new technologies and equipment or restricting the development of new technologies and products, or jointly boycotting transactions, through means such as communication, exchange of sensitive information, or coordinated behavior.

　　Article 6. Vertical monopoly agreements are prohibited. Internet platform operators or operators within the platform shall not use data, algorithms, technology, or platform rules to directly or indirectly reach vertical monopoly agreements, such as fixing the resale price of goods to third parties or setting a minimum resale price, by means of unifying, limiting, or automatically setting resale prices of goods.

　　Platform operators' actions of requiring merchants on their platforms to offer them trading conditions equal to or better than those of other competing platforms in terms of commodity prices and quantities may constitute a monopoly agreement or an abuse of market dominance.

　　To analyze whether the above-mentioned behaviors constitute vertical monopoly agreements as stipulated in Article 18, Paragraph (3) of the Anti-Monopoly Law, factors such as the platform operator's market power, the competitive situation in the relevant market, the degree of obstruction to other operators' entry into the relevant market, and the impact on consumer interests and innovation can be comprehensively considered.

　　Article 7. Hub-and-spoke agreements are prohibited. Platform operators with competitive relationships shall not, through their vertical relationship with internet platform operators, or through the organization, coordination, or assistance of internet platform operators, reach hub-and-spoke agreements that have the effect of horizontal monopoly agreements. To analyze whether such an agreement constitutes a monopoly agreement regulated by Articles 17 and 18 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, it may be considered whether competing platform operators have used technical means, platform rules, data, and algorithms to reach and implement a monopoly agreement that excludes or restricts competition in the relevant market. 

　　Platform operators or operators within the platform provide substantial assistance to other operators in reaching monopoly agreements, including providing necessary support, creating key facilitating conditions, or other significant assistance.

　　Article 8. Collaborative behavior is prohibited. Collaborative behavior refers to actions taken by internet platform operators or operators within the platform that are substantially coordinated and consistent through data, algorithms, platform rules, or other means, even though no explicit agreement or decision has been entered into.

　　Whether an internet platform operator or a business operating within the platform constitutes concerted action requires consideration of factors such as identical conduct, communication of intent, expectation of trust, restrictions on competition, direct or indirect evidence, and barriers to exit. Exceptions include parallel actions such as price following by the internet platform operator or a business operating within the platform based on independent intent, or where contrary evidence can be provided to prove the absence of concerted action.

Topic 2: Sensitive Behaviors Related to Monopolistic Agreements

　　(i) Using the platform to collect and exchange sensitive information such as prices, sales volume, costs, and customers; using technical means to communicate intentions; using data, algorithms, platform rules, etc. to achieve coordinated behavior; and other methods that help achieve collaboration.

　　(ii) Using technical means to automatically set prices; using platform rules to unify prices; using data and algorithms to directly or indirectly limit prices; using technical means, platform rules, data and algorithms to limit other transaction conditions, thereby excluding or restricting market competition.

　　(iii) Using the actual resale price as a performance indicator for the counterparty to restrict the resale price in disguise; punishing counterparties who violate the resale price restriction by means of punitive measures such as canceling discounts, reducing search ranking, limiting traffic, or even terminating the agreement; inducing counterparties to comply with the resale price restriction by means of incentives such as providing rebates, discounts, subsidies, and traffic resources.

　　(iv) Assisting other operators in making false or misleading commercial promotions by organizing fake transactions, fabricating user reviews, deleting unfavorable reviews, falsifying traffic, falsely increasing visitor numbers, and forging logistics documents.

　　(v) In the course of providing network services, online shopping and other business activities, providing goods, money or other economic benefits beyond the limits stipulated by law for commercial purposes such as attracting advertising clients, increasing website popularity and increasing click-through rates of users.

　　(vi) Encouraging or assisting platform users in transferring data, audio and video content from other platforms by providing technical support or other means.

　　Chapter Three Abuse of Market Dominance

　　Article 9. Determination of Market Dominance. Market dominance refers to the market position of an operator in a relevant market, which enables it to control the price, quantity, or other trading conditions of goods, or to hinder or influence the entry of other operators into the relevant market. When determining whether an internet platform operator or an operator within the platform possesses market dominance, factors such as the competitive characteristics of the relevant industry, business model, transaction amount, transaction volume, number of users, network effects, lock-in effects, technological characteristics, market innovation, ability to control traffic, ability to acquire and process relevant data, and the operator's market power in related markets may also be considered. When determining whether two or more operators possess market dominance, factors such as consistency of operator behavior, market structure, transparency of the relevant market, and degree of homogeneity of relevant goods will also be considered.

　　When an internet platform operator or operators within a platform hold a market share of one-half in the relevant market, or when two operators together hold a market share of two-thirds and each holds at least one-tenth, or when three operators together hold a market share of three-quarters and each holds at least one-tenth, the operator is generally presumed to have a dominant market position. If an operator presumed to have a dominant market position has evidence to prove otherwise, they should not be deemed to have a dominant market position.

　　To determine the market share of an internet platform operator or a business operating within the platform, one can consider the proportion of transaction amount, transaction volume, sales revenue, number of active users, clicks, usage time, or other indicators in the relevant market, while also considering the duration of that market share.

　　Article 10. Abuse of Market Dominance is Prohibited. Internet platform operators or operators within their platforms with market dominance shall not use data, algorithms, technology, or platform rules to engage in acts prohibited under Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, such as unfair pricing, selling below cost, refusal to deal, restrictive dealing, discriminatory treatment, tying, or imposing unreasonable trading conditions, thereby abusing their market dominance. If there are legitimate reasons for engaging in the prohibited acts listed in items 2 through 6 of Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, such acts shall not be deemed an abuse of market dominance.

　　Operators with a dominant market position who use data, algorithms, technology, and platform rules to create barriers and unreasonably restrict other operators also constitute an abuse of their dominant market position. Internet platform operators must not offer better terms to their own goods and services than they offer to other operators on the platform, nor may they engage in other forms of discrimination, such as violating relevant laws and regulations by cutting off other operators' access to platform services, or using data collected through technological means to promote their own goods and services.

　　Internet platform operators' actions of requiring merchants on their platforms to offer them transaction conditions equal to or better than those of other competing platforms in terms of product prices and quantities may constitute an abuse of market dominance or a monopoly agreement.

Topic 3: Sensitive Behaviors of Abusing Market Dominance

　　(i) Whether the operator's selling price or purchase price is significantly higher or lower than the price at which other operators sell or purchase the same or comparable goods under the same or similar market conditions; whether it is significantly higher or lower than the price at which the same operator sells or purchases the same or comparable goods in other areas under the same or similar market conditions.

　　(ii) Under the condition that costs are basically stable, whether the sales price is increased or the purchase price is decreased beyond the normal range; whether the increase in the sales price of goods is significantly higher than the increase in costs, or whether the decrease in the purchase price of goods is significantly higher than the decrease in costs for the trading counterpart.

　　(iii) Whether the operator squeezes out other competing operators with prices below cost, and whether it is possible that after squeezing other operators out of the market, it will raise prices to obtain undue profits, harm fair market competition, and infringe upon the legitimate rights and interests of consumers. In determining whether goods are sold below cost, the focus should be on whether the price is lower than the average variable cost. Average variable cost refers to the cost per unit that varies with the quantity of goods produced.

　　(iv) Whether the operator has substantially reduced the number of existing transactions with the counterparty; delayed or interrupted existing transactions with the counterparty; refused to conduct new transactions with the counterparty; made it difficult for the counterparty to conduct transactions with the counterparty by setting restrictive conditions such as setting prices that are unacceptable to the counterparty, repurchasing goods from the counterparty, or conducting other transactions with the counterparty; or refused the counterparty's use of its necessary facilities under reasonable conditions in its production and operation activities.

　　(v) Whether the operator has engaged in any behavior that requires operators on the platform to "choose one of two" among competing platforms or restricts the counterparty to conduct exclusive transactions with it through exclusive agreements or other means; whether the operator restricts the counterparty to only trade with its designated operators or to trade through its designated channels or other restrictive means; or whether the operator restricts the counterparty from trading with specific operators.

　　(vi) Whether the operator violates trade practices, consumption habits, or disregards the function of the goods, and uses contract terms, pop-ups, or mandatory operation steps that are difficult for the counterparty to choose, change, or refuse to bundle or sell different goods in combination; imposes unreasonable restrictions on the contract period, payment method, transportation and delivery method of goods, or provision of services; imposes unreasonable restrictions on the sales area, sales target, and after-sales service of goods; imposes unreasonable fees in addition to the price during the transaction; or imposes transaction conditions unrelated to the subject matter of the transaction.

　　(vii) Whether the operator uses big data and algorithms to implement differentiated transaction prices or other transaction conditions based on the payment ability, consumption preferences, and usage habits of the counterparty; implements differentiated standards, rules, and algorithms; or implements differentiated payment conditions and transaction methods.

　　(viii) Whether the above-mentioned behaviors are justified can be determined by referring to Articles 13 to 17 of the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission on the Platform Economy and Articles 14 to 19 of the Regulations on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance.

　　Chapter Four Concentration of Undertakings

　　Article 11 The concentration of undertakings shall be implemented in accordance with the law. If an internet platform operator or operators within a platform merge, acquire control over other operators through equity or asset acquisition, or acquire control over other operators or be able to exert decisive influence over other operators through contracts or other means, and if the requirements of the "Regulations of the State Council on the Standards for Declaration of Concentration of Undertakings" are met, a declaration shall be made to the anti-monopoly enforcement agency in advance. Concentrations shall not be implemented without declaration or until approval is obtained after declaration. Concentrations involving contractual control structures fall within the scope of anti-monopoly review of concentrations of undertakings.

　　If a merger of undertakings does not meet the reporting standards stipulated by the State Council, but there is evidence proving that the merger has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency may require the undertakings to report the merger and notify them in writing. If the merger has not yet been implemented, the undertakings may not implement the merger before reporting it or after obtaining approval; if the merger has already been implemented, the undertakings shall report it within 120 days from the date of receiving the written notice and take necessary measures, such as suspending the implementation of the merger, to reduce the adverse impact of the merger on competition.

　　Any entity or individual who discovers a business combination that does not meet the reporting threshold but has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition may submit a written report to the anti-monopoly enforcement agency, providing relevant facts and evidence. Upon verification, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall handle any business combination that does not meet the reporting threshold and has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition in accordance with the preceding paragraph.

　　Factors determining whether to implement centralization include, but are not limited to, whether market entity registration or rights change registration has been completed, whether senior management personnel have been appointed, whether there has been actual participation in business decision-making and management, whether sensitive information has been exchanged with other operators, and whether businesses have been substantially integrated.

　　Article 12. Factors to Consider in Business Operator Concentration. For concentrations of internet platform operators or operators within a platform, factors such as the operator's market share and control over the market, the market concentration of the relevant market, the impact of the concentration on market entry and technological progress, and the impact of the concentration on consumers and other relevant operators must be considered. In the platform economy, in addition to revenue as an indicator, the operator's market share can also be measured by transaction amount, transaction volume, number of active users, clicks, usage time, or other indicators representing its proportion in the relevant market. Furthermore, a comprehensive assessment of market share over a longer period can be conducted to determine its dynamic trends.

　　Article 13. Precautions for Concentration of Undertakings. Internet platform operators and operators within their platforms shall proactively comply with the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Provisions of the State Council on the Standards for Declaration of Concentration of Undertakings, the Provisions on the Examination of Concentration of Undertakings, and the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission on the Platform Economy, and other relevant regulations to prevent legal risks arising from failure to declare in accordance with the law. If an internet platform operator or operator within its platform meets the declaration standards for concentration, and the operator fails to declare the concentration, implements the concentration without approval after declaration, or violates the examination decision, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency will conduct an investigation in accordance with the Provisions on the Examination of Concentration of Undertakings.

Topic 4: Sensitive Behaviors Related to Business Operator Concentration

　　(i) If the concentration of internet platform operators or operators within a platform meets the following criteria, it shall be declared to the anti-monopoly enforcement agency in advance, and the concentration shall not be implemented without declaration: The total global turnover of all operators participating in the concentration in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB10 billion, and at least two of the operators have a turnover exceeding RMB400 million in China in the previous fiscal year; or the total turnover of all operators participating in the concentration in China in the previous fiscal year exceeds RMB2 billion, and at least two of the operators have a turnover exceeding RMB400 million in China in the previous fiscal year. "Previous fiscal year" refers to the fiscal year preceding the date of signing the concentration agreement.

　　(ii) In the platform economy, an operator's turnover includes the revenue it receives from selling goods and providing services. The calculation of turnover may vary depending on industry practices, fee structures, business models, and the role of the internet platform operator. For internet platform operators that only provide information matching and collect commissions or other service fees, turnover can be calculated based on the service fees collected by the platform and other platform revenue. If the internet platform operator specifically participates in market competition on one side of the platform or plays a leading role, the transaction amount involved in the platform can also be calculated.

　　(III) Antitrust enforcement agencies pay close attention to mergers involving start-ups or emerging platforms, mergers where the participating operators have low turnover due to adopting a free or low-price model, high market concentration, or a small number of competitors. For mergers that do not meet the reporting criteria but for which there is evidence that the merger has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the antitrust enforcement agency may require the operators to file a report. If an operator fails to file a report as required, the antitrust enforcement agency shall conduct an investigation in accordance with the law.

　　(iv) For business combinations that have or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall make a decision in accordance with Article 34 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. For business combinations that are not prohibited, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency may decide to impose the following types of restrictive conditions: structural conditions such as divestiture of tangible assets, divestiture of intangible assets such as intellectual property rights, technology, and data, or divestiture of related rights; behavioral conditions such as opening up infrastructure such as networks, data, or platforms, licensing key technologies, terminating exclusive agreements, modifying platform rules or algorithms, and committing to compatibility or not reducing the level of interoperability; and comprehensive conditions combining structural and behavioral conditions.

　　Chapter Five: Abuse of Administrative Power to Exclude or Restrict Competition

　　Article 14 prohibits the abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict competition. Administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations to perform public affairs management functions (hereinafter referred to as administrative bodies) and public resource trading platforms shall not abuse their administrative power to prevent other operators from entering the relevant market or to treat other operators unfairly, thereby excluding or restricting competition, by signing cooperation agreements, memorandums, or other means with operators.

　　While taking precautions, internet platform operators and operators within their platforms should also be aware of Articles 39 to 45 of the Anti-Monopoly Law and Article 22 of the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission on the Platform Economy, which stipulate specific behaviors that may constitute an abuse of administrative power to exclude or restrict market competition in the platform economy.

　　Internet platform operators and businesses operating within their platforms are not exempt from legal liability if administrative bodies or public resource trading platforms abuse administrative power to exclude or restrict competition. If operators can prove that their abuse of market dominance or monopolistic agreements were a result of passively complying with administrative orders, they may receive lighter or reduced penalties according to law. When faced with such situations, operators must explicitly refuse such actions and, if necessary, file complaints and reports with anti-monopoly enforcement agencies.

Topic 5: Abuse of Administrative Power to Eliminate or Restrict Competition-Sensitive Behaviors

　　(i) Whether the administrative body or public resource trading platform restricts or indirectly restricts entities or individuals from operating, purchasing, or using goods provided by designated Internet platform operators or operators within the platform, or goods related to platform services provided by other operators.

　　(ii) Whether the administrative body or public resource trading platform sets discriminatory standards or implements discriminatory policies against out-of-town internet platform operators or platform operators, adopts administrative licenses or registrations specifically targeting out-of-town internet platform operators or platform operators, or uses software or internet blocking methods to obstruct or restrict out-of-town internet platform operators or platform operators from entering the local market and hinder the free flow of goods between regions.

　　(iii) Whether the administrative body or public resource trading platform excludes or restricts out-of-town internet platform operators or platform operators from participating in local bidding and other business activities by setting discriminatory qualification requirements, evaluation and review standards or failing to publish information in accordance with the law; whether it discriminates against out-of-town internet platform operators or platform operators, excludes, restricts, forces or indirectly forces out-of-town operators to invest or establish branches in the local area; and whether it forces or indirectly forces internet platform operators or platform operators to engage in monopolistic behavior as stipulated in the Anti-Monopoly Law.

　　(iv) Whether the administrative body or public resource trading platform has formulated or issued regulations, normative documents and other policy documents containing exclusionary or restrictive content on market access, industrial development, investment promotion, bidding and tendering, government procurement, business conduct norms, qualification standards and other matters related to the economic activities of market entities in the platform economy field, as well as specific policy measures in the form of "one case at a time" in the form of measures, decisions, announcements, notices, opinions, meeting minutes, letters, etc.

　　Chapter Six: Legal Liability and Obligation to Cooperate with Investigations

　　Article 15 Legal Liability. Internet platform operators or operators within their platforms who reach and implement monopoly agreements, abuse their dominant market position, or illegally implement mergers of undertakings shall be dealt with in accordance with Articles 56, 57, and 58 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, respectively. If an operator reaches and implements a monopoly agreement due to the abuse of administrative power by administrative organs or organizations authorized by laws and regulations to manage public affairs, it shall be dealt with in accordance with Article 56 of the Anti-Monopoly Law; if it constitutes an abuse of dominant market position, it shall be dealt with in accordance with Article 57 of the Anti-Monopoly Law.

　　Internet platform operators or operators within their platforms who engage in monopolistic practices that cause losses to others shall bear civil liability in accordance with the law, and if such practices constitute a crime, they shall be prosecuted criminally in accordance with the law. If an operator's monopolistic practices harm the public interest, the people's procuratorate at the prefecture-level city level or above may file a civil public interest lawsuit with the people's court in accordance with the law.

　　When determining the specific amount of fines stipulated in Articles 56, 57, and 58 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency takes into account factors such as the nature, extent, duration, and circumstances of eliminating the consequences of the illegal act.

　　Article 16 Obligation to Cooperate with Investigations. Internet platform operators, or operators within their platforms and their employees, shall cooperate with anti-monopoly enforcement agencies in their lawful investigations of suspected monopolistic conduct. They shall not refuse or obstruct investigations; otherwise, the operators or employees shall bear the legal responsibilities stipulated in Article 62 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. In the event of a surprise investigation by anti-monopoly enforcement agencies without prior notice, operators and employees shall fully cooperate with the enforcement personnel.

Topic Six: Legal Risks of Monopolistic Practices

　　(I) According to Article 56 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, if an operator reaches and implements a monopoly agreement, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall order it to cease the illegal act, confiscate the illegal gains, and impose a fine of not less than 1% and not more than 10% of its sales revenue in the previous year; if there were no sales revenue in the previous year, a fine of not more than 5 million yuan shall be imposed; if the reached monopoly agreement has not yet been implemented, a fine of not more than 3 million yuan may be imposed. If the legal representative, principal responsible person, and directly responsible personnel of the operator bear personal responsibility for reaching the monopoly agreement, a fine of not more than 1 million yuan may be imposed. If an operator organizes other operators to reach a monopoly agreement or provides substantial assistance to other operators in reaching a monopoly agreement, the same method shall apply. If an operator reaches and implements a monopoly agreement due to the abuse of administrative power by administrative organs and organizations authorized by laws and regulations to perform public affairs management functions, the same method shall apply; if the operator can prove that its reaching of the monopoly agreement was caused by passively complying with administrative orders, it may be given a lighter or reduced penalty according to law.

　　(II) According to Article 57 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, if an operator abuses its dominant market position, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall order it to cease the illegal act, confiscate its illegal gains, and impose a fine of not less than 1% and not more than 10% of its sales revenue of the previous year, depending on factors such as the nature, degree, duration, and elimination of the consequences of the illegal act. If an operator abuses its dominant market position due to the abuse of administrative power by administrative organs or organizations authorized by laws and regulations to perform public affairs management functions, it shall be dealt with in the same manner; if the operator can prove that its abuse of dominant market position was caused by passively complying with administrative orders, it may be given a lighter or reduced penalty in accordance with the law.

　　(iii) According to Article 58 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, if an operator illegally implements a concentration of operators and it has or may have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall order it to cease the concentration, dispose of its shares or assets within a specified period, transfer its business within a specified period, and take other necessary measures to restore the business to the state before the concentration, and impose a fine of up to 10% of its sales revenue in the previous year; if it does not have the effect of excluding or restricting competition, a fine of up to RMB 5 million shall be imposed.

　　(iv) According to Article 62 of the Anti-Monopoly Law, if an operator refuses to provide relevant materials or information, or provides false materials or information, or conceals, destroys, or transfers evidence, or engages in other acts of refusing or obstructing investigation, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency shall order it to make corrections and impose a fine of up to 1% of the previous year's sales revenue on the entity, or a fine of up to RMB 5 million on the entity if there was no sales revenue in the previous year or the sales revenue is difficult to calculate; and a fine of up to RMB 500,000 on the individual.

　　(v) If an operator violates the relevant provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and the circumstances are particularly serious, the impact is particularly egregious, and the consequences are particularly severe, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency may determine the specific amount of the fine to be not less than two times and not more than five times the amount of the fine stipulated in Articles 56, 57, 58, and 62 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. If an operator is subject to administrative penalties for violating relevant anti-monopoly regulations, the violation shall be recorded in its credit record in accordance with relevant national regulations and made public.

　　Chapter Seven: Internal Compliance Management for Business Operators

　　Article 17. Commitment System. If the investigated internet platform operator or operators within the platform commit to taking specific measures to eliminate the consequences of such conduct within a timeframe approved by the anti-monopoly enforcement agency, the agency may decide to suspend the investigation. However, the anti-monopoly enforcement agency does not accept applications for suspension of investigation in cases involving suspected monopolistic agreements that fix or change commodity prices, restrict the quantity of commodity production or sales, or divide sales markets or raw material procurement markets. In other words, the commitment system does not apply to major horizontal monopolistic agreement cases.

　　An investigation may be suspended if the decision is made due to incomplete or untrue information provided by the operator, a significant change in the facts upon which the suspension decision was based, or if the operator fails to fulfill its commitments. The specific scope and procedures for operators applying for commitments can be found in relevant regulations such as the "Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements," the "Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance," and the "Guidelines for Operator Commitments in Monopoly Cases by the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission."

　　Article 18. Leniency System. In cases involving horizontal monopoly agreements, internet platform operators or operators within their platforms who proactively report relevant information and provide crucial evidence to the anti-monopoly enforcement agency until the investigation concludes may apply for leniency. Reports regarding the monopoly agreement include, but are not limited to, the participating operators, the scope of goods involved, the content and method of reaching the agreement, the specific implementation of the agreement, and whether applications have been made to other overseas enforcement agencies. Crucial evidence refers to evidence not yet possessed by the anti-monopoly enforcement agency that plays a key role in initiating the investigation or determining the existence of the monopoly agreement. The anti-monopoly enforcement agency will decide whether to mitigate or exempt penalties based on the order of the operator's proactive reporting, the importance of the evidence provided, and the relevant circumstances of reaching and implementing the monopoly agreement. The specific application standards and procedures for operators applying for leniency shall be based on the relevant provisions of the Anti-Monopoly Law, the Provisions on Prohibiting Monopoly Agreements, and the Guidelines for the Application of the Leniency System in Horizontal Monopoly Agreement Cases by the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission.

　　Article 19. Anti-Monopoly Compliance Management System. Internet platform operators shall, based on their business scale, platform functions, business model, and main sources of risk, establish an anti-monopoly compliance management system covering all business areas, departments, and branches of the platform enterprise. This system shall establish a division of responsibilities and accountability mechanism for anti-monopoly compliance, clearly defining the scope of responsibilities and liabilities of departments and personnel. Top management and senior and middle-level managers shall publicly make and fulfill anti-monopoly compliance commitments, and other employees shall make and fulfill corresponding anti-monopoly compliance commitments. Internal mechanisms such as compliance consultation, compliance inspection, compliance reporting, and compliance assessment shall be improved to effectively implement anti-monopoly compliance management and consciously accept supervision from anti-monopoly enforcement agencies and public oversight.

　　Article 20 Training Management. Internet platform operators and operators within the platform shall regularly conduct compliance training for their senior management and employees to enhance their awareness and capabilities in anti-monopoly compliance. At the same time, they shall report their anti-monopoly compliance management systems and implementation effects to the anti-monopoly enforcement agencies and consciously maintain a fair and competitive market order in the platform economy.

　　Article 21 Anti-Monopoly Compliance Recommendations. When internet platform operators and operators within their platforms use open-source code, general algorithms, and other technological means to achieve pricing and targeted advertising, they should avoid price collusion and assess in advance the potential exclusionary or restrictive effects on competition.

　　Confidential information concerning competitors or trading partners regarding competitive sensitive information must be kept confidential, and should not be disclosed or shared with internal or external personnel on a larger scale, nor should it be used for other purposes. Competitors should avoid directly communicating or exchanging competitive sensitive information with each other, or indirectly exchanging such information through third parties such as industry associations, advertisers, or platform operators. Avoid collecting, transferring, or transmitting competitive sensitive information between competing trading partners, or facilitating the exchange of such information between competing trading partners.

　　Platform operators may purchase goods from multiple upstream suppliers that are competitors, or they may supply goods to multiple downstream companies that are competitors. Even if there is no competition between the platform operator and the upstream or downstream companies, the platform operator should avoid organizing, coordinating, or assisting competing upstream or downstream companies in reaching or implementing monopolistic agreements.

　　Platform operators with market dominance are likely to constitute restrictive trading practices by engaging in "choose one of two" unless they can prove a legitimate reason. Even if a platform operator does not have market dominance, it may still risk constituting a vertical monopoly agreement by implementing "choose one of two" or using platform rules, data, algorithms, technology, etc., to impose vertical restrictions, which may have a significant effect of excluding or restricting competition.

　　Platform operators with a dominant market position should avoid bundling downloads in the design of software or applications. When providing users with product software or applications for download, they should avoid bundling other software or applications with the download and should inform users in an appropriate manner to ensure their right to choose whether to download or refuse to download software or applications.

　　Article 22. Compliance Recommendations for Intellectual Property Protection. Establish rules for intellectual property protection, improve the mechanism for handling intellectual property infringement complaints, actively implement the recommended national standard "Management of Intellectual Property Protection on E-commerce Platforms," ​​and implement full-process management and protection of intellectual property.

Topic Seven: List of Main Responsibilities of Platform Operators

　　(i) When engaging in fair competition with operators within the platform, without justifiable reason, the platform will not use non-public data generated or provided by operators and their users when using platform services. When operators or users within the platform access, register, log in, or obtain the platform services they require, they will not make the use of services provided by other affiliated platforms a prerequisite.

　　(II) It is recommended that platform operators establish and improve data security review and internal control mechanisms. The processing of user personal information, cross-border data flows, and data development activities involving national and public interests must be conducted strictly in accordance with laws and regulations to ensure data security. E-commerce platform operators should establish intellectual property protection rules, strengthen cooperation with intellectual property rights holders, and protect intellectual property rights in accordance with the law.

　　(III) It is recommended that platform operators establish effective content management systems based on the characteristics of their platforms to prevent the spread of illegal and non-compliant information on the platforms. Upon discovering information that violates laws and regulations, contravenes public order and good morals, or has a negative impact on the online ecosystem, measures such as warnings, restrictions on publication, cessation of transmission, information deletion, suspension of updates, or even account closure should be taken, depending on the circumstances. Relevant records should be preserved and reported to regulatory authorities.

　　(iv) For goods and services that are expressly prohibited or restricted from sale or provided by laws, regulations and relevant normative documents, Internet platform operators shall dynamically establish a review term database and control mechanism, establish a platform review mechanism and a daily inspection mechanism, and promptly report any illegal or irregular activities to the relevant departments.

　　(v) Without the user’s consent, the Internet platform operator shall not combine personal data obtained through the platform service with personal data from its other services or third-party services, and shall not induce or coerce users to log in and use other services it provides for the purpose of merging personal data.

　　(vi) When platform operators use the big data they possess for product recommendations, order allocation, content push, price formation, performance evaluation, and reward and punishment arrangements, they must adhere to the principles of fairness, impartiality, and transparency, comply with laws and regulations, respect social morality and basic scientific ethics, and must not infringe upon the basic rights of citizens or the legitimate rights and interests of enterprises.

　　(vii) Platform operators shall comply with price-related laws and regulations during their operations and shall not use platform rules and technical means such as data and algorithms to engage in unfair pricing practices such as price discrimination, price gouging, and predatory pricing. They shall not use false or misleading pricing methods to induce consumers to make transactions.

　　(viii) Platform operators shall comply with the provisions of the Advertising Law and other relevant laws and regulations in the operation of the platform, and strengthen the early warning and post-event handling of illegal and irregular advertisements by operators on the platform. Internet platform operators shall cooperate with relevant departments in accordance with the law to investigate and deal with illegal advertisements on the platform, provide necessary data, and assist law enforcement.

　　(ix) Platform operators shall strictly abide by national laws, regulations, and provisions related to the protection of natural persons' privacy and personal information during their operations, and fulfill their responsibilities for protecting natural persons' privacy and personal information. If the personal information of users processed by a platform operator is leaked, altered, or lost, or is likely to be leaked, altered, or lost, the platform operator shall take remedial measures in a timely manner and notify the natural persons as required; if serious consequences are caused or may be caused, the platform operator shall immediately report to the regulatory authorities, cooperate with the regulatory authorities in the investigation and handling, and bear corresponding responsibilities.

　　Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions

　　Article 23 Special Reminder. This guide is not a normative document. The information listed is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal or other professional advice, nor should it be used as a legal statement or basis for administrative enforcement in any jurisdiction.

　　Article 24. Interpretation of the Guidelines. The Guangdong Provincial Administration for Market Regulation is responsible for interpreting these guidelines and will adjust them as needed in accordance with anti-monopoly laws and regulations, departmental rules, and guidelines.

　　Attachment: Reference List of Anti-Monopoly Related Documents

　　1. Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China (August 2022)

　　2. Anti-monopoly Guidelines of the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission on the Platform Economy (February 2021)

　　3. Provisions prohibiting monopoly agreements (April 2023)

　　4. Regulations Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominance (April 2023)

　　5. Provisions of the State Council on the Standards for Declaration of Concentration of Undertakings (September 2018)

　　6. Regulations on the Review of Concentration of Undertakings (April 2023)

　　7. Provisions on Preventing the Abuse of Administrative Power in Eliminating or Restricting Competition (April 2023)

　　8. Guidelines on the Application of the Leniency System in Horizontal Monopoly Agreement Cases by the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State Council (January 2019)

　　9. Guidelines for Operator Commitments in Monopoly Cases Involving the State Council Anti-Monopoly Commission (January 2019)

　　10. Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Fair Competition Review System (June 2021)

　　Textual Interpretation: Interpretation of the "Guangdong Province Internet Platform Operator Competition Compliance Guidelines (Anti-Monopoly)"

　　Infographic Explanation: A Comprehensive Guide to the "Guangdong Province Internet Platform Operator Competition Compliance Guidelines (Anti-Monopoly)"